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bumpers or cleats, a glass jar within which sulphuric acid
is transported. The injuries took place when in some
manner the carboy broke, causing acid to come in contact
with plaintiff's bodyo
STATE~1ENT

OF FACTS

For a period of several years prior to July 28, 1958
defendant had been purchasing chemically pure (CP)
Sulphuric Acid from General Chemical Division of Allied
Chemical and Dye Corporation (Tr. 191). This acid was
delivered packaged in several ways (Tr. 226). One of the
methods of packaging was in a container known as a
carboy. A carboy consists of a wooden box or frame
which surrounds and encases a six and one-half gallon
machine blown glass jar or bottle. The glass jar or bottle
is supported at the top and bottom of its main body by
rubber buffers or cleats which are in turn supported by
the corner posts of the wooden box. The sides and bottom
of the glass jar are separated from the sides and bottom
of the wooden box by an air space (Tr. 216, 217, 155, 156,
158, Exhibit No. 3).
Also, for a period of several years defendant had
been selling to General Mills at its Ogden Plant, chemically pure sulphuric acid in carboys and had been delivering same to the plant where the carboys and acid were
stored in the basement (Tr. 6, 7, 42).
Plaintiff was a laboratory technician engaged in the
conducting of various tests on grain as an employee of
General Mills at its Ogden Plant and had been so em-
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ployed for approximately fourteen and one-half years
prior to the occurrance from which this action arose ( Tr.
4, 38). The accident occurred on July 28, 1958 in the
basement of one of the buildings at the General Mills
Plant and in the area where the carboys and sulphuricacid were stored.
The last delivery of sulphuric acid made by defendant prior to the accident was made on May 16, 1958 (Tr.
47, 222), and neither defendants nor any of its employees
had any opportunity to see, observe, inspect or examine~
or in any way deal with the carboys containing the sulphuric acid from that date until the date of the accident..
It is possible that the carboy. in question was delivered
prior to May 16, 1958, but it is not possible that it was
delivered later than that date, and it was therefore in the
complete care, custody and control of General Mills and
its employees from May 16, 1958 to July 28, 1958, thedate of the accident (Tr.15, 48).
On July 28, 1958, plaintiff, accompanied by a fellow
laboratory employee, Jack Winters, went from the laboratory on the second floor to the basement for the purpose
of carrying a carboy full of acid back to the laboratory
to replace an empty one (Tr.10, 11). It was their custom
to carry the carboy by means of a litter type device which
consisted of two long rails which clamped underneath
the flanges of the wooden box. They pulled the carboy
involved in this accident out from its place in the corner~
affixed the carrying device by tightening up the bolts
and clamping the rails underneath the flanges on the

5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sides of the wooden box. Winters stepped between the
rails at the front and the plaintiff between the rails at
the back and they proceeded to lift the carboy directly
upward from the floor (Tr. 11, 45). The bottom of the
carboy had reached a height of approximately one foot
to eighteen inches from the floor when in some manner
the bottom of the carboy, or part thereof, and the glass
jar, or part thereof, together with the acid fell to the
floor (Tr. 11, 37). Some of the acid splashed on plain~
tiff's feet and ankles, causing a burning sensation. He
attempted to make his way to the wash room to wash
the acid off with water and while endeavoring to do so
slipped and fell down in the acid, causing the acid to come
in contact with other parts of his body and resulting
in burning to those areas as well as his feet and ankles.
The carboy, including the wooden frame and the
glass jar, was built in accordance with specifications set
forth in Interstate Commerce Commission Regulations
which strictly specify all details of construction (Tr. 41,
154, 155, Exhibit 131). It was at all times the property
of General Chemical Division of Allied Chemical and Dye
Corporation (Tr.155, 156, 174, 190). It was in the possession of defendant and of General Mills only as a means
of containing and transporting the sulphuric acid which
had been purchased by defendant from Allied Chemical
and Dye Corporation and in turn sold by defendant to
General Mills, the employer of plaintiff in this case. Title
to the carboy at no time passed from Allied Chemical and
Dye Corporation to any other person, or corporation (Tr.
189, 190, 197, 198). The carboy was filled with the acid
6
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at Denver by Allied .Chemical and Dye Corporation, was
shipped and transported in its filled condition to defendant at Salt Lake City (Tr. 191). Defendant in turn transported it to the plant of General Mills at Ogden where
it was placed in the basement of a building at that plant
and when it remained in its filled condition in the
custody of General Mills until the time of the accident
in question. The carboy was inspected outwardly, as
were all containers, when it was handled at the plant oi
Wasatch Chemical Company, the defendant, in Salt Lake
City, and there is no evidence that its appearance was
other than that of a sound, adequate, properly constructed
and properly maintained carboy, either at the time of its
receipt in Salt Lake City by defendant, or at the time of
its delivery to the premises of General Mills at Ogden,
and, in fact, there is no evidence of any discoverable or
discernable defect in the carboy in any way, or at any of
the times covered by the evidence in this case ( Tr. 141,
143, 163, 175, 176, 177, 198, 199).
Counsel for defendant moved for a non-suit or dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's action at the close of
plaintiff's evidence and for a directed verdict after both
parties had rested, both of such motions being denied by
the trial court (Tr. 125, 234).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PROPERLY
INSTRUCT THE JURY AND IN ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTING AS TO THE APPLICABLE LAW RELATIVE TO DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT'S DUTY AS A SELLER.

7
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POINT II.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTING THE JURY RELATIVE TO THE ISSUE OF
PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
POINT III.
THAT THE ·COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL AT THE CLOSE OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT'S CASE, AND DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AFTER BOTH PARTIES
HAD RESTED.
POINT IV.
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT RESERVES THE FILING OF A REPLY BRIEF ON THE POINTS RAISED BY
PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT IN HIS CROSS APPEAL
ON WHICH HIS BRIEF HAS NOT BEEN FILED AS OF
THIS TIME.

.A.RGUMENT
POINT I
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PROPERLY
INS'TRUCT THE JURY AND IN ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTING AS TO THE APPLICABLE LAW RELATIVE TO DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT'S DUTY AS A SELLER.

Plaintiff's cause of action in this case sounded in two
counts, the first count being in Tort based upon alleged
negligence on the part of defendant, and the second
count being in Contract based upon breach of warranty
on the part of the defendant.
At the close of the evidence, counsel for defendant
moved for a directed verdict on plaintiff's complaint of

8
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no cause of action and also moved to strike the first count
of plaintiff's complaint which sounded in Tort. (Tr. 234)
The Court granted the motion as to the first count and
submitted the case to the jury on the basis of the second
count sounding in Contract on the matter of W arrantyo
(Tr. 234) The Court thus undertook the burden of instructing the jury with respect to the law as it applied to the question of the alleged breach of warranty on thepart of the defendant and on the issue of contributory
negligence on the part of plaintiff. The latter issue is dis- _
cussed under Point II of this brief.
The Court refused to grant Defendant's Requested
Instructions Numbers One, Four, Five, Six, Seven, Eight,
Nine, Ten, Eleven, Twelve, Thirteen, Fourteen, Fifteen, _
and Sixteen, and counsel for defendant excepted to this
refusal (Tr. 238). It is the contention of defendant and
appellant that the Court erred in several particulars in
both the instructions given and in the refusal of defend- ant's requested instructions. Defendant's Requested Instruction Number One read as follows:
"You are instructed to return a verdict in
favor of defendant and against plaintiff, no cause _
of action."
This, of course is tantamount to a directed verdict
and based upon the applicable authorities which are cited
hereafter, it is the contention of defendant and appellantthat the case should not have been submitted to the jury
on the question of warranty since no warranty of condition of the carboy, which was merely a container and
means of transporting the acid which was the subject _
9
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matter of the sale, was ever made nor brought into effect
by operation of law on the part of defendant and appellant. This subject matter was also covered by Defendant's Requested Instruction Number Eight which reads
as follows:
"You are instructed that defendant had no
duty to inspect the carboy which was involved in
this case, and therefore, unless you find the carboy was made unsafe by some act of the defendant
you must return a verdict in favor of defendant
and against plaintiff."
Defendant's duty as to inspection was spelled out
in Defendant's Requested Instructions Number Nine and
Eleven. Requested Instruction Number Nine reads as
follows:
"You are instructed that defendant had no
duty to make a rigid inspection of the carboy involved in this case or to test it to determine its
strength and condition. Defendant's only duty is
to reasonably observe the outwardly apparent
condition of the carboy and to remedy any defects
which would be visible on such observation.
You are further instructed that plaintiff had
the same duty to observe the condition of the carboy."
Deefndant's Requested Instruction Number Eleven
reads as follows:
"You are instructed that if you find the acid
involved in this case was spilled because of a hidden defect in the carboy which would be discoverable only by testing, you must return a verdict
against plaintiff and in favor of defendant."

10
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It is conceded that some authorities hold there is a
duty to make a reasonable inspection on the part of
seller, while other authorities hold in a situation such as
this where the container itself is not the subject of the
sale, that the seller has no duty to even inspect. The
former situation is covered by Instructions Number Nine
and Eleven as requested, and the latter situation is cov- ered by Instruction Number Eight as requested. An
essential element in any case is that the defect must be
reasonably discernable or discoverable in the exercise of _
reasonable care and inspection on the part of the seller.
In no event should the seller be held responsible for a
hidden or latent defect and there is absolutely no evidence
of any discoverable defect in this case. It is to be noted
that the seller is neither the owner nor the manufacturer
of the carboy involved in this accident. The sale actually
involves only the sale of a certain quantity of chemically
pure sulphuric acid from defendants to plaintiff's em- _
ployer in a container which experience had shown to be
of a safe type of construction. (Tr. 161, 163)
p

From these facts it is evident that the duty of defendant must be even less than the duty of a manufacturer. The manufacturer, of course, in this case is
Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation.
The Court's attention is directed to Restatement of
the Law of Torts, Section 402, at Page 716, 1948 Supple- ment, which reads as follows:
"ABSENCE OF DUTY TO INSPECT
CHATTEL. A Vendor of a chattel manufactured
by a third person, who neither knows nor has _
11
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reason to know that it is, or is likely to be, danger.
ous, is not subject to liability for harm caused· by
the dangerous character or condition of the chat.
tel even though he could have discov-ered it by
an inspection or test of the chattel before selling
it."
Also found in Restatement of the Law of Torts, 1948
Supplement, Section 402, Page 717 is the following statement:
"b. ·There is a clear distinction between the
liability of a manufacturer and that of a vendor
for harm caused by a chattel made by the former
and sold by the latter. The manufacturer of a
dangerously defective chattel is the creator of
something which is forseeably dangerous when it
is used for the purpose for which it is manufactured. The constructing of the chattel defectively, with knowledge it is to be sent out to be
used, is an unreasonably dangerous activity. On
the other hand, the vendor who reasonably believes that the chattel he is selling is safe for use
is not, in selhng and delivering the chattel, doing
anything which i.s foreseeably likely to cause harm.
The slight risk ~nherent in the possibility the
chattel may be defective is not sufficient to constitute an unreasonable risk. The burden on the
vendor of requiring him to ~nspect chattels he
reasonably believes to be free from hidden dange·r
outweighs the magnitude of the risk that a particular chattel may be dangerously defective (See
Sec. 291-293). Negligence is determined in the
light of the facts known to the actor. (See Sec.
282, Comment g)." (Italics added.)
It is to be noted that defendant, the seller in this
case, relied not only upon the generally good and reliable
12
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reputation of the manufacturer, Allied Chemical and Dye
Corporation, but also upon the stringent requirements.
of the Interstate Commerce Commission regulations. (Tr.
161, 162, 192) There is no evidence that the carboy in
question showed any discoverable defects at any of the
times involved in this case and in fact, all evidence is that
its outward appearance indicated it to be alright.
The Court's attention is directed to pages 718, 71!1
and 720 of the same section of the Restatement of Torts
where the small minority of cases which do not follow
the general rule are discussed and scathingly criticized
and the text quotes with favor the great majority of authorities in support of defendant's position herein. The
applicable ICC Regulations to which we have aluded herein are as follows:
"78.4-1 Compliance. (a) Required in all details.
78.4-4 (b) Marking. Each carboy bottle must
be permanently marked in bottom as follows :
Maker's mark (to be registered with Bureau
of Explosives)
Year of Manufacture
ICC-ID
"78-4-5 Glass carboy bottle. (a) Must be
machine-blown, thoroughly and properly annealed,
with screw thread finish having at least one continuous thread to accommodate closure; top of lip
smooth and even; must contain 14 pounds of glass,
tolerance minus 8 ounces plus 16 ounces. Minimum thickness to be .075 inch. Defective carboys
not authorized.

13
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"78.4-6 Outside containers. (a) Wooden
boxes completely enclosing body and neck of carboy, with 4 vertical corner posts, two cleats for
shoes and two carrying cleats. An opening not
exceeding 3 inches in width may be provided
directly above the neck of bottle, if the top of the
box is made up of not more than two pieces of
lumber of 25 j32 inch thickness. Bottom board of
the two ends of the box must be constructed of
lumber at least one inch thick, must be flush with
the carrying cleats and be at least 23;4 inches in
width. Cleats or other fasteners used to secure
cover must not extend beyond carrying cleats.
(b) Lumber to be well seasoned, commercially dry, and free from decay, loose knots, knots
that would interfere with nailing, and other defects that would materially lessen the strength.
(c) Assemble sides and ends with grain of
wood horizontal and nail as specified. Nail bottom
to sides and ends ; fasten top by any efficient
means. Cleats for shoes to be along edges of
bottom parallel to carrying cleats and at right
angle to the direction of bottom board or boards.
"78.-4-8 Tests-( a) Apparatus. Standard required. Detail prints can be obtained from Bureau
of Explosives, 30 Vesey Street, New York 7, N.Y.
(b) Method. Fill with water to lower edge
of neck; swing 55" measured from wall to nearest
bottom edge of basket :
(1) Side shock; test at least 10 carboys.
(2) Bottom shock, test at least 5 carboys.
(c) Acceptable results. 90 percent of carboys must not break under side shock; same for
bottom shock.

14
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(d) When required. By each manufacturing
and each filling plant; during each 6 months of
each year, one series each year to be witnessed by representative of Bureau of Explosives; separate
tests required for~
(1) New package (those with new outside
container).
( 2) Used packages.
( 3) Packages differing in kind of cush=
ioning."
All of these regulations apply to Allied Chemical &
Dye Corporation, the manufacturer, not to defendant who
is only a vendor of the acid (Tr. 156, 160).
Thus, Defendant was entitled to rely not only on
the good reputation of its supplier, but also on the double
safeguard of the stringent construction and testing re= ~
quirements of the ICC Regulations which govern persons
or corporations that own and fill such carboys.
The following holding is found in Witt Ice a'Yld Gas Company v. Bedway, 1951.Arizona, 231 P. 2nd 952, where
the Court said~
"A wholesale or retail dealer, who sells in
their original packages goods brought from repu- _
table manufacturers, acts as a conduit through
which the goods pass from manufacturer to consumer, who buys them in reliance upon the manu=
facturer's reputation for competence and care. .A
vendor of such goods, therefore, is under no duty to subject them to rigid inspection or tests before
selling them."
While it is clear that the manufacturer has some duty
of inspection, the rule of H ewit v. General Tire and Rub-

15
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ber Company (Utah 1955) .3 Utah 2d, 354, 284 P. 2d 471,
holds that mere proof of an injury will not justify a
verdict or judgment imposing liability upon a manufacturer and if the evidence does not show any negligence
on the part of the manufacturer, there can be no recovery
regardless of the fact that the injured person was not
negligent. Certainly, defendant's duty as the seller is not
as great as the duty of the manufacturer and even under
the manufacturer rule, defendant could not be held in
warranty i_n this case.

The Hewitt case follows the law as set forth in a
prior Utah case, Hooper v. General Motors Corporati·on,
260 P. 2d 551, which says:
"Thus, to impose liability on an assembler of
an automobile, certain necessary elements must
be made out. Plaintiff is required to show: (1) A
defective wheel at the time of automobile assembly; ( 2 ) Such defects being discoverable by reasonable inspection; (3) Injury caused by failure
of the wheel due to its defective condition."
It is to be noted that there is absolutely no evidence
on just what sort of defect did exist in the carboy at or
immediately prior to the happening of the accident from
which this action arises. There is certainly no evidence
that there was any discoverable defect and there is ample
evidence that defendant, through its employees, made
reasonable inspection of this and all carboys, both in its
Sat Lake Plant and in the course of delivery, and that no
defect was observed prior to the time that the carboy
was deposited in the building of General Mills in Ogden,

16
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Utah. In fact, the carboy withstood shipment from Denver to Salt Lake by truck (Tr. 191) unloading at the Salt
Lake Plant of defendant, reloading onto the truck of
defendant at the Salt Lake Plant (Tr. 175 ), transportation by truck with no padding or other means of preventing the normal jarring of riding in a truck between
Salt Lake and Ogden, unloading at Ogden and placing
on a two-wheeled hand truck by defendant's employee,
and bumping down a flight of stairs to the basement by
means of being lowered from step to step on the twowheel hand truck in the process of delivery by defendant's employee. (Tr. 138, 139) Throughout all of this thecarboy remained in tact and the acid remained within its
container. Certainly if there was a defect which would
have been discoverable by Defendant it would have showed up and been discovered in the course of such
handling. However, after remaining in the basement of
the General Mills building for approximately two and _
one-half months with no evidence of leakage the carboy
was simply slid a distance of a iew feet across the floor
and was then lifted directly up some twelve to eighteen
inches at which point it gave way. Nowhere in the Court's
instructions is the matter of "such defects being discoverable by reasonable inspection" treated or discussed. In
fact, in Instruction Number Eight the Court instructed
the jury as follows:
"Mr. Palmer has not only the burden of proving that the defect was present at the time of delivery, but also that the defect was a 'substantial
defect.' A substantial defect in this case is defined
as one that rendered the package so unsafe that 17
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a reasonably prudent person, exercising ordinary
care for the safety of others would not have deQ
livered a package with such a defect, or would
have specifically warned the receiver of the pres~
ence of the .defect. Also, it must have been such
a defect that its delivery would have been withheld or warned of because a reasonably prudent
person exercising ordinary care for the safety of
others would have foreseen the risk of an incident
of the general type of the incident alleged by Mr.
Palmer."
There is no evidence that defendant knew of the
defect and there is no evidence that defendant could have
known of the defect in the exercise of reasonable care or
ordinary inspection of the carboy. Thus, under the
Court's instructions the defendant is placed in the position of being a ·virtually absolute insurer of plaintiff's
well being, despite the fact that defendant could reason~
ably have done nothing to guard against the mishap which
occurred.
A similar question is involved in the Federal case of
Burgess v. Montgomery Ward and Company, 264 F2d
495 (lOth Cir. Kan. 1959), which holds ~
"In a case such as that now before us it is
completely unreasonable to expect the shopkeeper
to perform the inspection or test which would
have revealed to an expert the defect in the ladder
rail. (Defendant) is operating a retail store, not a
testing laboratory."
A similar rule is established in Willey v. Fyrogas 251
SW 2d 635 (1952 Mo.).

18
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The Utah case of Matievitch v. Hercules Powder
Company, 3 Utah 2d, 283, 282 P.2d 1044, is a case involving explosion of dynamite, which holds that there is n()
absolute liability or insurability on the part of a manufacturer of explosives. Again it is noted that the burden
certainly is greater upon a manufacturer than it is upon
a seller in the position of defendant in this case. If there
was a defect in the carboy prior to or at the time of its
delivery, not later than May 16, 1958 by defendant, such
defect was hidden and not discernable to defendant unless
exhaustive laboratory type tests were conducted. Defendant certainly does not have the duty to conduct such
tests.
The California case of Simmons v. Rhodes and
Jamieson, Ltd., 293 P .2d 26, says :
"In absence of evidence of feasible means of
discovering defects or danger in commodity sold,
seller is not liable for an injury resulting from
the use of the commodity."
The Utah case of Winchester v. Egan Farm Service,
4 Utah 2d 129, 288 P. 2d 790, involving a seller of farm
machinery who also did assembling of the machinery
says:
"Where the implement dealer asembled machinery according to the manufacturer's design
and instructions, the fact that a bolt of a different
size might have fit better did not place the responsibility or duty on the implement dealer to
place such bolt thereon and did not maKe the
dealer liable to purchaser for injuries suffered
when lever unlocked and struck purchaser in the
19
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face as dealer had no obligation to redesign machinery."
The recent Washington case of Smith v . .American
Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 266 P. 2d 792 goes even one step
further in holding that:
"One selling a chattel, manufactured by another, without knowledge or reason to know that
it is or is likely to be dangerous, is not liable for
harm caused by its dangerous character or condition, though he could have discovered danger by
inspection or tests of chattel before selling it."
The evidence in this case is that carboys of the type
involved, constructed under rigid government specifications and tested in accordance with government requirements, have been proven by long use to be safe containers.
In fact, the evidence introduced by experts on behalf of
defendant indicates that despite long experience these
experts had never seen the bottom fall completely out of
a carboy. (Tr. 163)
A further ground for the granting of Defendant's
Requested Instruction Number One is the lack of privity
between defendant and plaintiff. The contract for sale
of the acid was between defendant and General Mills,
Incorporated, plaintiff being a laboratory employee of
the latter. The general rule on this point is found in
American Jurisprudence, Sales, Sec. 810 p. 934.
"Liability to Remote Buyer or Other Third
Person General Warranty- Liability of Seller.
It has been held that the buyer's tenant, the buyer's employee, or a member of the buyer's family
20
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who is injured through the article sold cannot base
his action against the seller on an express or implied warranty."
Cited in support of this statement with respect to
"the buyer's employee" is the case of Berger v. Standard
Oil Company, 126 Ky. 155, 103 S.W. 245, which says:
"A warranty is always a matter of contract~
For its breach, damages may be recovered by any
party to the contract injured thereby, including
any person for whose benefit the contract is made~
but strangers to the contract have no right of action upon it. There is lacking privity, mutuality,.
consideration and every other element essential
to constitute the contractual relation between the
claimant and the person sued."
Thus, while defendant does not concede that there
was any warranty of the carboy by defendant to anyone,
it is also argued that even had there been such a warranty, such warranty could not inure to the benefit of
plaintiff in this case.
46 Am. J ur. Sales, Sec. 306, 487
"Liability of seller to third persons. The fact
that a seller warrants the condition or quality of a
thing sold does not itself, according to one view,
impose any liability on him to third persons who
are in no way parties to the contract. In such a
case there is no privity of contract between the
seller and the third persons and this precludes any
right on their part to any advantage or benefit
to be derived from the warranty. There is authority to the effect that there can be no implied warranty without privity of contract and it has been
held that a manufacturer is not liable for breach
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of warranty to third persons who are strangers
to the c-ontract of manufacturer or sales for the
results of any defects which may later develop in
his product."
Numerous cases are cited in support of this statement and the Court's attention is directed to the footo
notes under numbers sixteen, seventeen, eighteen, nineteen and twenty, found on pages 487 and 488 of Vol. 46 of
Am. Jur.
There are a number of cases in point and supporting
the general rule requiring privity. Following are some
of these cases and their holdings.

Wood, et al v. General Electric Co., et al.,, 159 Ohio
273, 112 N.E. 2d 8 (1953)
"Although a subpurchaser of an inherently
dangerous article may recover from its manufacturer for negligence in the making and furnishing of the article, causing harm to the subpurchaser or his property from a latent defect
therein, no action may .be maintained against a
manufacturer for injury, based upon implied warranty or fitness of the article so furnished."
Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz.
163, 317 P. 2d 1094 (1958):
"A a general rule, no implied warranty inures
in absence of privity of contract; but in the case
of food, beverages and drugs, on implied warranty
by the manufacturer that goods are pure and free
from deleterious foreign substances inures to
benefit of ultimate consumer of those goods, by
operation of law even in the absence of privity
of contract."
22
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Odell v. Frueh, 146 Cal. App. 2d 504, 304 P. 2d 45
(1957) :
"The seller of goods other than food stuffs
is bound by his unadvertised warranty only t()
parties with whom he is contractually obligated.'"
Collum v. Pope and Talbot, Inc., 135 Cal. App. 2d
653, 288 P.2d 75 (1956) :
"Exceptions to general rule that privity of
contract is required in action for breach of eitherexpress or implied warranty have been made in
cases involving food stuffs and a few cases where
purchaser of a product relied on representations
made by manufacturer on labels or advertising
material."
Burr v. Sherwivrt Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268
P.2d 1041 (1954) :
"Generally, privity of contract is required in
an action for breach of either express or implied
warranty, and there is no privity between the
original seller and a subsequent purchaser who is in no way a party to the original sale."
Abercrombie v. Union Portland Cement Co., 35 Id.
231, 205 p. 1118 (1922) :
"The general rule, to which there are certain well established exceptions is that a manufacturer
or vendor of an article is not liable to any person,
other than the immediate purchaser of such article
because of defect therein."
Burgner-Bowman Lumber Co. v. McCord- Kestler
Mercantrle Co., 114 Kan. 10, 216 P. 815 (1923)
A contractor engaged in construction of a building
ordered from plaintiff, a dealer, some Portland Cement .
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for purpose of constructing a hard surfaced concrete
floor. He advised plaintiff of the purpose for which it
was wanted and requested Portland Cement. Plaintiff
delivered the cement which was of poor and inferior
quality which caused the floors to check, crack and disintegrate.
The Court held doctrine of caveat emptor has no
application and that there was an implied warranty of
quality.
In the same action to recover for the price of the
cement and to establish a mechanic's lien, a cross petition
was filed by the owner of the building who sought to recover for damage to the building caused by the defective
cement.
The ·Court held that as there was no contractual
relations between the dealer and the owner of the building
the trial court properly denied the owner the right to
recover damages.

Miller v. Hand Ford Sales, Inc., 340 P.2d 181 (Ore.
1959):
"The theory of breach of an implied warranty
arises only out of privity of contract."

Cockran v. McDonald, 23 Wash. 2d 348, 161 P.2d 305
(1947):

"A dealer is not liable on express warranty
of a manufacturer which is put out with or attached to goods manufactured unless the dealer adopts
warranty and makes it his own when selling goods
24
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to another, and mere sales does not adopt warranty as dealer's own.
"The whole saler was not liable to buyer of ·
anti-freeze on express warranty which manufacturer had affixed to container of anti-freeze.''
Dobbin v. Pacific Coast Coal Company, 170 P. 2d
642 (1947):
A purchaser of new house with faulty furnace which
was sold by distributor to retailer who installed the
furnace for builder before house was sold, could not recover against distributor, retailer or builder on theory of breach of warranty express or implied or any other
contractual theory, since there was no privity between
purchaser and any of defendants.
The Court further erred with resulting prejudice to defendant in Insthuction Number Three which reads in
part as follows:
"General Mills bought from Wasatch Chemical ·Company acid. The law implies in their agree- ment not only that the acid would be as specified
but also that it would be delivered in a reasonably safe container. The law also implies that
the duty to deliver in a reasonably safe container
runs not only to General Mills, but also to Gen- eral l\1ills employees who ·would reasonably be
expected to handle the container."
The third sentence of this instruction is in error on
the basis of the authorities cited above. The second sen- tence is in error on the basis of the authorities dealing
with the matter of warranty and the duties of defendant
with respect to the container which have been previously
cited.
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Instruction Number Three is also erroneous and
prejudicial in its fourth paragraph which reads as
follows:
"The defendant alleges that all of the containers they delivered were reasonably safe, therefore
they have not breached their contract and are not
liable for any damages."
This is only a part of defendant's position and defendant also specifically alleged and argued to the Court
that defendant had no duty or obligation to see to the
safeness or condition of the containers and certainly had
no obligation or duty to test them to discover latent or
hidden defects.
Instruction Number Four of the Court is erroneous
in that it places a burden upon defendant to deliver a
container which would "be sufficiently safe to withstand
reasonable handling."
Instruction Number Six given by the Court is also
erroneous and prejudicial as it improperly states the
law with respect to the duties of defendant relative to the
carboy and its condition.
Instruction Number Seven is erroneous and prejudicial as it improperly states the law and further proposes an illustration which infers a condition to have
existed on which there is absolutely no evidence, and
which inference is prejudicial to defendant.
The instruction in this regard says :
"Such as if acid was present and attacking the
carboy when delivered, but did not sufficiently
26
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weaken the carboy to make it unsafe until after it
had acted for a time at the General Mills place."
There is absolutely no evidence that any acid was
present except as contained within the glass jar at the
time of delivery and the evidence is clear that if acid were
spilled within the container its action would be complete
within a matter of hours.
It must be concluded from the foregoing that the
Court erroneously and improperly instructed the jury
and that the defendant's position was prejudiced by such _
instruction.
POINT II.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN IMPROPERLY IN~
STRUCTING THE JURY RELATIVE TO THE ISSUE OF
PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT'S CONTRIBUTORY NEG~
LIGENCE.

It is clear from the pleadings and the record in this
case that one of the issues of fact which was always before the court and which was submitted in a somewhat round about way to the jury was the issue of contributory
negligence on the part of plaintiff. It certainly must be
conceded that if the jury had found, under Instruction
Number Four, that the plaintiff was raising the container _
in other than a reasonably prudent manner when the
incident occurred the verdict would have had to be no
cause of action in favor of defendant.
However, in Instruction Number Three, the Court ·
failed completely to instruct the jury with respect to the
defendant's contention that plaintiff was contributorily
negligent. Instruction Number Four as given by the
Court relates only to the manner of handling of th~
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carboy by plaintiff, but does not instruct the jury upon
the duty of plaintiff to exercise reasonable care and to
make a reasonable inspection of the carboy to ascertain
whether there were any discernable defects or evident
damage which would render it unsafe to handle. It is
again noted that the plaintiff was an expert in dealing
with substances such as the sulphuric acid contained in
the carboy, being a trained laboratory technician who
had been engaged as a technician for fourteen and onehalf years by General :Mills. The matter of negligence
was covered by Defendant's Requested Instruction Number Six which read:
"Negligence is the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would have done under
the circumstances, or doing what such person under such circumstances would not have done. The
fault may lie in acting or in omitting to act."
Contributory negligence was covered by Defendant's
Requested Instruction Number Seven :
"Contributory negligence is negligence on the
part of a person injured which, cooperating with
the negligence of another, assists in proximately
causing his own injury.
"One who is guilty of contributory negligence
may not recover from another for any injury suffered because if both parties were at fault in negligently causing an injury the degree of negligence
cannot be weighed by the jury."
Defendant's Requested Instruction Number Ten also
dealt with the degree of care to which plaintiff was held.
It read:
"You are instructed that the plaintiff had a
duty to use reasonable care for his own safety.
28
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If you find that he did not exercise such ca:re in
the handling of the carboy involved in this case
and that his failure to exercise reasonable care contributed to the accident and his injuries, you
must return a verdict against the plaintiff and
in favor of the defendant."
The instructions of the Court are insufficient in
their definition of the terms of negligence, contributory negligence and the burden or duty of care placed upon
plaintiff, and are also prejudicial to defendant in that
they do not submit the issue as raised and involving all
elements of handling the container by plaintiff, particularly in view of his special training and experience.
p

POINT III.
THAT THE ·COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DISD
MISSAL AT THE CLOSE OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT'S CASE, AND DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AFTER BOTH PARTIES
HAD RESTED.

p

It is clear from the transcript that the Court submitted this case to the jury under plaintiff's second count
and on the question of breach of warranty only. It is
contended by defendant and appellant that there was no _
privity between defendant and plaintiff in this case and
that thus plaintiff could not be the beneficiary of any
warranty, express or implied if such existed. Further,
that there was no warranty of the carboy, which was merely a container, running from defendant to General
Mills. The only warranty to which defendant could be
held as a vendor would be that the goods (that is the
chemically pure sulphuric acid) would be suitable for the .
29

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

purpose for which they were intended. The carboy was
never a part of any sale and in fact title to the carboy
remained at all times in Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation.
The authorities relating to defendant's position as a
vendor and on the question of whether or not defendant
could be held to any warranty express or implied with
respect to the carboy, have been set forth and discussed
under Point I of this brief.
The evidence is clear that there was no discernable
or discoverable defect in the carboy and the evidence is
also clear that defendant, through its employer made
reasonable inspections of this carboy as well as all carboys which pa~sed through its hands prior to and at the
time of delivery of such carboys. Defendant cannot be
held to be an absolute insurer of plaintiff's well being
and cannot be held on a theory of virtually absolute liability for a latent or hidden defect in the carboy if such
defect results in injury to plaintiff. If any such duty exists that duty must be on the part of the manufacturer,
Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation, and not upon
defendant in this case. This position is further supported
by the Interstate Commerce Commission Regulations
cited herein which place the duty of compliance with
construction requirements and of compliance with strict
testing requirements on the owner and manufacturer,
that is Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation. Since the
only basis on which defendant could be held liable was
that of warranty, and since under the applicable law
no warranty existed, it is contended that the Court erred
30
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in submitting the case to the jury and in failing to grant
defendant's motions for dismissal and directed verdict
in its favor.
POINT IV.
DE·FENDANT AND APPELLANT RESERVES THE FILING OF A REPLY BRIEF ON THE POINTS RAISED BY
PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT IN HIS CROSS APPEAL ON WHICH HIS BRIEF HAS NOT BEEN FILED AS OF
THIS TIME.

Defendant and appellant has received notice of cross
appeal from counsel for plaintiff and respondent notifying that the plaintiff and respondent cross appeals from
the order of the District ·Court, Honorable John F. Wahlquist, Judge thereof, granting defendant's motion t(}
dismiss plaintiff's first count and in withdrawing from
the jury any and all matters set forth and alleged in the
first count wherein plaintiff sought to recover judgment
against the defendant on the theory of negligence. The
Court found that there were insufficient facts to proveeither negligence by specific testimony or under thedoctrine of res ipsa loquitur. (Tr. 234) Defendants contends that this was a proper ruling and that it is supported by the record in this case. There is not sufficient
evidence to eliminate the possibility under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur of negligence on the part of the manufacturer Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation, prior to
the time that the carboy in question was delivered to de- fendant in this case. There further is not sufficient evidence to rule out the possibility of negligence on the part
of some other person during the period of approximately
two and one-half months that the carboy was in the ex- .
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elusive, care, custody and control of General Mills, Inco
at its Ogden plant between the last possible date of deG
livery by defendant and the date of the accident in this
case. Defendant and appellant therefore reserves the
right to file a reply brief after receiving plaintiff and
respondent's cross appeal brief on this point so that authorities and further argument may be offered to the
Court on this point.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing argument and authorities it
appears clear that the Court erred with resulting
prejudice to the defendant and appellant in failing to
grant defendant and appellant's motion for dismissal
and motion for directed verdict in favor of defendant
and appellant, and further that the Court erred in improperly and erroneously instructing the jury on material
issues and questions of law.
It is, therefore, the conclusion of defendant and
appellant that this Court should reverse the District
Court and should find the issues in favor of defendant
and appellant and direct a verdict of no cause of action,
or in the alternative and without prejudice to the foregoing conclusion it is urged that the Court should remand
the matter for a new trial on the basis of the other errors
assigned.
Respectfully submitted,
KIPP AND CHARLIER
Attorneys for Defendant
CARMAN E. KIPP
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